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AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE OF SEC CORPORATE DISCLOSURE
Ill
J. Richard ZECHER *
Richard Zecher argues that inodern corporate finance theory provides a theoreticalframework from
from which SEC corporate disclosure can be analyzed. After examining four theories - portfolio
theory. capital asset pricing theory, efficient market theory and agency - Zecher posits that a series of
questions are left unanswered. He then discusses host, the "market for managers," which consists of a
well- developed inforination system, is effective for monitoring management and has been underesti-
mated. His proposal is made in light of the estimated costs to corporations of the current financial
disclosure system. He concludes that use of modern corporate finance theory although useful, also
leaves a series of questions to be answered in the future.
1. Introduction
The Committee has concluded that, notwithstanding the arguments of economists and
others that the efficient market hypothesis, the random walk theory, and the strength of
market forces have rendered obsolete or unnecessary much or all of the mandatory
disclosure system administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission, these argu-
ments are not sufficiently compelling to justify dismantling the existing system at this time
(Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure to the Securities and Exchange Commission
(1978)).
The fifty-year old SEC corporate disclosure system remains an enigma to
most economists. Part of the reason for the enigma is that few economists have
made any serious effort to analyze the corporate disclosure system. Until quite
recently the economics profession lacked a theoretical framework of the
corporation, the capital markets, and the role of economic information that
was adequate to the task of studying a government program generating
detailed facts about individual corporations. Such a framework now exists in
the set of propositions known as modern corporate finance theory. One object
of this article is to draw together various parts of this theory relevant to the
analysis of the SEC corporate disclosure system, and to review some of the
studies that have been done in this area.
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Corporate finance theory can shed light on the market failure explanation
for the SEC disclosure system. What market processes is the system supposed
to improve? What aspects of the corporation, viewed as a nexus of contracts,
work better because of disclosure? Two other reasons also help to explain why
economists have shown little interest in the SEC disclosure system. First. the
disclosures are totally specific to individual corporations and deal with a minor
part, usually estimated at twenty-five percent, of the firm's total risk of asset
price or return volatility. Moreover, firm specific risk is easily shed through
portfolio diversification. Second, the SEC disclosure system is a government
program, not subject to the price and quality disciplines of the private
marketplace. Therefore, according to public choice theory, various interest
groups are the most important factor in shaping the system. Government
programs are probably less sensitive than private sector programs would be to
the programs' costs, or their effectiveness in providing useful information to
the markets, or to other functions they might usefully serve. Judging from the
remarks by the Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure quoted above,
economists form one interest group that has had little influence on the
direction SEC corporate disclosure has taken. Whether or not this is desirable
can be debated; what is clear is that economists, through the development of
modem corporate finance theory, have a great deal to say about the corpora-
tion and the markets in which the SEC corporate disclosure system operates.
2. Modern corporate finance theory and SEC corporate disclosure [2]
Modem corporate finance theory and practice have changed radically in
recent years. The more important of these changes have direct relevance to the
SEC corporate disclosure system.
2.1. Portfolio theoiy [3]
Modern portfolio theory has moved portfolio management away from the
art of picking groups of "winners" to the science of constructing diversified
portfolios that meet the risk/return preferences of investors. Portfolio managers
are now routinely expected to obtain the maximum return for a given level of
risk, or, equivalently, accept minimum risk for a given level of return. Properly
diversified portfolios, even those comprising a relatively limited number of
firms and industries, can efficiently eliminate up to about half the risk
(volatility of return) of owning a single firm. This development means that
managers need to know the risk characteristics of assets, how their returns vary
with returns on other assets, and the market in general. Such information is
obtained by managers and individual investors not from SEC documents, but
from price and return histories that are available from many commercial
sources.
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The theory and practice of modern portfolio management raises important
questions about firm specific SEC corporate disclosure. Does it aid portfolio
managers in meeting their obligation to maximize return for a given portfolio
risk? If so, how?
One possible answer to these questions is that SEC corporate disclosure
improves the pricing of individual securities. However, the same portfolio
techniques that work for American securities also work for foreign securities,
and for mixtures of American and foreign securities. A second major branch of
modern corporate finance theory suggests that securities are priced to reflect
the risk they contribute to the total risk in a diversified portfolio, so that
riskiness of a single firm cannot be evaluated in isolation. A third branch
suggests that information disclosed through the SEC system plays a minor role
compared to firms' voluntary disclosures or the price and return histories
available to the investment public.
2.2. Capital asset pricing theory [4]
Capital asset pricing theory is widely used in the private sector to evaluate
asset prices, and it has been used to provide evidence on asset pricing relevant
to public policy issues. More efficient or accurate disclosure seems to have
been an important role foreseen for SEC corporate disclosure in its early days,
as exemplified by the sophisticated views of future Justice William 0. Douglas
during the 1930s:
Even though an investor has neither the time, money, or intelligence to assimilate the mass
of information in the registration statement, there will be those who can and who do so
whenever there is a broad market. The judgment of those experts will be reflected in the
market price [5].
The clear implication of this view is that pricing efficiency improves with SEC
mandated disclosure.
In the 1960s and 1970s, as the capital asset pricing model was developed
and refined, economists focused upon improving equity pricing through
expanded SEC disclosure requirements. The results have not been generally
favorable to the usefulness of SEC corporate disclosure in the asset pricing
markets. As Susan Phillips and I concluded in our earlier review of the
empirical work [6]:
The evidence reviewed here provides no support for the notion [that the SEC disclosure
system improves pricing efficiency in the asset markets], as it relates to markets for
secondary issues, and at best weak or inconclusive support, as it relates to markets for new
issues. It would seem that, if we are to discover the benefits of the SEC disclosure system.
we must look elsewhere [7].
As is typical in quantitative economic studies, the findings are open to
differing interpretations and to an array of criticisms including statistical
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technique and quality of basic data. Yet it is hard to see how those who view
SEC corporate disclosure as the centerpiece of an information system that
supports the pricing of American corporations can glean much comfort from
these empirical studies.
2.3. Efficient market theoty
A third major branch of modern corporate finance, efficient market theory,
provides another way of viewing SEC corporate disclosure. The basic tenet of
this theory is that a market is efficient in the pricing of assets if it is impossible
to make systematic, or continuing, economic profits by trading on available
information. Early studies [8] showed the inability to forecast stock prices, and
that stock prices followed a "random walk," behaving as if they were indepen-
dent random drawings.
An extension of this theory [9] revolutionized macroeconomic theory by
dividing all forward-looking variables into "expected" and "unexpected"
components. In a rational expectations framework, economic agents will act
now on their expectation of the future, and only the unexpected surprises will
have further effect on behavior at the time they occur. The questions facing
macro-economic theorists are similar to those which should be facing SEC
corporate disclosure administrators. How do market participants form their
judgments on expected returns and risks? Is the information provided by SEC
mandated corporate disclosure an important part of this process? If not, why
are we doing it?
2.4. Agency theory
A fourth, and the newest branch of corporate finance theory is agency
theory [11]. An example of an agency relationship most relevant to corporate
disclosure activities is the role of corporate managers as agents to stockholders.
The most interesting questions concern how to design compensation schemes
to induce agents to behave in the best interests of the principals, and how to
devise the most effective system for monitoring the agents' behavior.
Assuming that the compensation scheme for management is set competi-
tively to meet marketplace standards and is designed to encourage managers to
act in the equity owners' best interest, we can turn our attention to the
monitoring function. Effective monitoring requires equity owners to take a
personal interest in managing the firm. Few equity owners, however, devote
much of their time to monitoring since most investors spread their wealth over
many firms. In a sense, these equity owners exchange the risk associated with
any single firm for the average "manager" risk in the market. While this
reduces their exposure to any one firm and any single team of managers, and
consequently reduces their incentive to monitor or run any particular firm, it
does not remove their incentive to monitor their agents effectively.
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Another obvious monitoring device is the regular publication of audited
financial results for the firm and other verifiable information that chronicles
the management's performance. Reliable corporate financial disclosure plays a
useful private sector role in supporting the corporate form of business enter-
prise. Evidence supporting this proposition comes from the fact that elaborate
corporate disclosure existed in the United States prior to the SEC and in
foreign markets. Benston reports:
The degree of disclosure of financial data also reflects the demand for data by investors and
the economies of supply by corporations. In 1926, all of the New York Stock Exchange
listed corporations published balance sheets and net income, fifty-five percent disclosed
sales, forty-five percent disclosed cost of goods sold, seventy-one percent disclosed depreci-
ation and eighty-two percent were audited by CPAs. By the year prior to the requirement of
disclosure by the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, the percentage of corporations
disclosing sales had risen to sixty-two, fifty-four percent had disclosed cost of goods sold,
and ninety-three percent had disclosed depreciation. Ninety-four percent of the listed
corporations were audited by CPAs [12].
If private markets, in the absence of government regulation, would devise
methods to assure the disclosure of all relevant financial information audited
and uniformly presented, then arguments in favor of mandating such dis-
closure by law are weakened. Mandating disclosure may seem appealing on the
reasoning that if it is desirable to disclose such information to help monitor the
behavior of management for large corporations, like those traded on the
NYSE, then it is also desirable to do so for smaller ones. This argument,
however, ignores the costs involved. There are major economies of scale in
disclosure. The cost of disclosure, as a proportion of sales or assets, rises
dramatically as firm size declines. Thus, prior to the SEC, audited financial
disclosure was generally not an important part of the market mechanisms that
developed to aid in monitoring the behavior of management and other agents
in smaller corporations.
2.4.1. The market for managers: a system for monitoring management
Agency theory suggests that another management monitoring system is the
market for managers, which can serve as an additional, if somewhat drastic,
monitoring device. Henry Manne has called the corporate takeover the market
for corporate control [13]. The market for corporate control has been quite
active recently, particularly in those industries undergoing massive regulatory
and technological change. This device for disciplining management and pro-
tecting the interests of shareholders has accordingly received much attention.
The market for managers, however, both inside and outside the corporate, has
been largely ignored as an important part of the system that monitors
management behavior. This is an important oversight since manager markets,
both inside and outside the corporation, are large markets with great liquidity
and large numbers of transactions. The manager markets consist of a well-de-
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veloped information system with no significant monopoly elements. These
markets are highly, if not perfectly, competitive.
Shareholder interests are served when management is highly motivated to
strive for higher productivity and better performance, thereby raising the value
of the firm. How do outside and inside markets for managers monitor
management behavior and contribute to these goals? The primary function of
the outside market for managers may be to monitor the adequacy of the
corporation's reward system. If a corporation's reward system for managers is
not sufficiently responsive to productivity and performance, the firm will not
be able to attract new management talent, or to keep the best of its existing
management talent. Since corporations are seeking new management talent
almost continuously, and since the market for managers is so well organized,
the news that a corporation inadequately rewards performance, and hence is
not acting in its shareholders' best interests, quickly becomes common knowl-
edge.
The monitoring role played by the market for managers within the firm has
been underestimated. This internal market may be just as important as the
outside management market from the point of view of shareholders.
There is also much internal monitoring of managers by managers themselves. Part of tie
talent of a manager is his ability to elicit and measure the productivity of lower managers.
so there is a natural process of monitoring from higher to lower levels of management. Less
well appreciated, however, is the monitoring that takes place from bottom to top. Lower
managers perceive that they can gain by stepping over shirking or less competent managers
above them. Moreover, in the team or nexus of contracts view of the firm, each manager is
concerned with the performance of managers above and below him since his marginal
product is likely to be a positive function of theirs. Finally, although higher managers are
affected more than lower managers, all managers realize that the managerial labor market
uses the performance of the firm to determine each manager's outside opportunity wage. In
short, each manager has a stake in the performance of the managers above and below him,
and, as a consequence, undertakes some amount of monitoring in both directions [14].
Together, the inside and outside markets for managers provide powerful
forces for monitoring and enhancing management performance. If these
markets for management were not so competitive and so effective in inducing
high levels of management performance, it is difficult to imagine how our
corporate structure, so dependent on the willing separation of "ownership"
and "control," could be sustained.
Modem corporate finance theory offers many important insights into the
corporate form of business organization. It not only recognizes the conflicts
that arise when shareholders and their agents (management) are separated, but
it also recognizes that the marketplace has developed some very effective
mechanisms to deal with these conflicts. Shareholders, first of all, can replace
the risk they are subject to from a particular management team by the risk
associated with the "average" management team by diversifying their wealth
across many firms. This reduces risk, but it would not be nearly so attractive a
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way of managing the risk of separation of ownership and control if there were
little confidence in the ability of the market to induce high levels of "average"
management performance. The existence of highly competitive inside and
outside markets for managers assures that performance usually will be care-
fully monitored. Managements that are exceptions to these tendencies will be
subject to discipline from the capital markets, where their shares are priced and
credit ratings established, and ultimately by the threat of corporate takeover by
more competent management teams or by investors. At this point the losing
management team must retire or re-enter the market for managers, where their
previous performance is a major factor in their market value.
3. Estimated costs of SEC disclosure
An important policy question concerning SEC corporate disclosure is how
much it costs. Unfortunately, no precise answer is available since estimates of
the various components of these costs are not regularly disclosed. One sample
of some of these costs, however, was produced by the Advisory Committee on
Corporate Disclosure (1977). This sample of costs, though small and not
scientifically designed to allow easy extrapolation to all reporting firms, has
been used to generate macro-estimates of some SEC corporate disclosure costs
for the sample year, 1975 [15]. This section discusses some of the findings of
that research.
The cost information requested from issuers in the Advisory Committee's
sample focused solely on fully variable costs. The surveyed firms were specifi-
cally instructed not to allocate to the preparation costs of documents any
general overhead expenses. The firms were also not to include any costs
incurred initially to set up new or additional accounting or auditing systems to
meet mandated disclosure standards. The only costs allowed were those that
could be immediately and fully eliminated if the mandatory corporate dis-
closure were closed down.
In table 1, some of these cost estimates for both voluntary and corporate
disclosure and SEC mandated disclosure (10K, 10Q and 8K) are shown for the
year 1975. Firms are broken down into large (assets averaging $2.6 billion),
medium (assets averaging $257 million), and small (assets averaging $26
million), so that the effects of size on reporting costs can be examined.
Reporting costs as a percent of assets rise dramatically for smaller firms for
both voluntary and SEC disclosures, but this rise is much more pronounced for
mandated disclosure.
The table reports an estimated $213,500,000 for the fully variable costs of
10K, 10Q and 8K disclosures in 1975. To this should be added the separate
estimate (not shown) of $191,900,000 for disclosure related to new issues in
1975, for a total estimate of about $400,000,000 for SEC disclosure costs in
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Table 1
Costs of voluntary and mandatory periodic disclosure by corporations as percent of assets, 1975
Voluntary disclosure Mandatory
periodic disclosure
Certified Cost Costs Costs
end of as a of 1OK, as a
Firm Number year Annual Total % IOQ total %
size of stint report cost of and 8K cost of
(assets) firms (SiM) (SIM) ($1M) assets (SIM) ($IM) assets
Large 734 723.4 149.9 644,700 0.034 57.1 41,900 0.0022
($2.6 billion)
Medium 1,859 243.2 194.7 814,100 0.163 19.6 36.400 0.0073
($268 million)
Small 7,191 72.9 47.3 864,400 0.462 18.8 135,200 0.0723
($26 million)
Total 9.784 2,323,200 213,500
Sources: Financial data from "Report of the Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure,"
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Committee Print 95-29, November 3,
1977. Registrations filed were developed from a 1 in 10 sample of the registrations listed in the
SEC News Digest, issues 75-1, dated January 2, 1975, through 75-250, dated December 30, 1975.
1975. These estimates are biased downward because they do not include
various fixed costs associated with SEC disclosure. While there is no estimate
of the magnitude of these costs, the cost estimates are highly sensitive to the
amount of "voluntary" disclosure expenses that should actually be in the
"mandatory SEC" disclosure categories. For example, if ten percent of the
"voluntary" expenses are actually overhead for 10K, 1OQ and 8K disclosures,
or for new issue disclosure, then that would have added about $200 million per
year to the total costs of the SEC disclosure system in 1975.
5. Conclusion
Modern corporate finance theory and practice has presented a series of
unanswered questions for the SEC corporate disclosure system. What market
processes is the system supposed to improve? What aspects of the corporation,
viewed as a nexus of contracts, work better because of corporate disclosure?
How could we tell if specific corporate disclosures were meeting their goals?
How can the system, which seems not to change in response to changing
markets, be made more sensitive to market discipline? How can the system be
made more responsive to the disclosure costs that it imposes, through the
corporation, ultimately on shareholders, customers, management, suppliers,
and others? These important questions need to be addressed in the future.
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